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A Comparative Survey of Canadian and American
Rape Law
by Professor Constance Backhouse* and Lorna Schoenrotht
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITHIN THE LAST five years there has been an explosion of interest
in the law as it applies to the crime of rape, yet little of this interest
has focused on a comparison of the legislation and jurisprudence of different countries. The laws of Canada and the United States prove an excellent source for comparable legal research in the area of rape as English
common law provided the foundation for the criminal law of both countries. Many similarities developed as a result of this common legal heritage, although some differences emerged since the American jurisprudence was separated from its English influence at an earlier point in time.
The socio-cultural resemblence between Canada and the United States
also produced notable similarities in the recent movement for rape law
reform, although some marked distinctions remain. In an attempt to begin a comparative analysis of Canadian and American rape law, this article will focus on the following issues: spousal exemption, the standards of
force, resistence, and consent; the admissibility of the complaintant's
prior sexual conduct; corroboration; and the recent redefinition and restructuring of the crime of rape.
II. THE SPOUSAL EXEMPION
Although the legal status of women, particularly married women has
changed radically since rape laws first developed, a man still cannot be
charged with raping his wife in Canada and many of the American states.
The spousal exemption effectively preserves the ancient status of wives as
their husband's chattels. Arguably, rape laws were developed to protect
the property interest of a father or husband in his daughter or wife's sexual capacity.1 From this perspective, a husband who raped his wife was
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario.
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1979; LL.B., Osgoode Hall Law School, 1975; B.A., University
of Manitoba, 1972.
t LL.B., University of Western Ontario, 1981.
' See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WI.L: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 18 (1975); L. CLARK
& D. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF CoFRcrvE SEXuALrrY 115-19 (1977); Gold & Wyatt, The
Rape System: Old Roles and New Times, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 695 (1978); LeGrande, Rape
and Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALF. L. REv. 919, 924 (1973); Robin, Forcible

Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System, 23 Crime & Delinq. 136,
149 (1977); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 306, 309 (1977).
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"merely making use of his own property.' The originators of the spousal
exemption, however, structured their analysis within the framework of
contract law. Lord Matthew Hale, writing in the 17th century, stated
"But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself, upon
his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she can'
not retract.'
Lord Hale's view that the marriage contract presumed irrevocable
consent to sexual relations was, until recently, widely accepted. Consequently little caselaw deals with the issue of marital rape. English courts
discussed marital rape in the 1888 case of R. v. Clarence." The accused
was charged with assault causing bodily harm after transmitting gonorrhea to his wife. His conviction was quashed on appeal, but of the commenting six judges in obiter, only Stephen J. and Baron Pollock clearly
supported Lord Hale's view that rape within marriage was a legal impossibility.5 Baron Pollock, referring to sexual intercourse between spouses,
wrote: "It is done in pursuance of the marital contract and of the status
which was created by marriage, and the wife as to the connection itself is
in a different position from any other woman, for she has no right or
power to refuse her consent."'
In contrast, Hawkins J. commented that a woman "conferred upon
her husband an irrevocable privilege to have sexual intercourse with
her." 7 However in his view, the privilege applied only during the time in
which the "ordinary relations" of the marriage existed between them.
Similarly, A.L. Smith J. felt that a husband could not be said to have
assaulted his wife by exercising his right to intercourse unless "consent
given at marriage was revoked."' Thus, consent was not necessarily irrevocable as Lord Hale had suggested. Two of the judges were more critical
of Lord Hale's position. Field J. commented:
The authority of Hale, C.J., on such a matter is undoubtedly as high as
any can be, but no other authority is cited by him for this proposition,
and I should hesitate before I adopted it. There may, I think, be many
cases in which a wife may lawfully refuse intercourse, and in which, if the
husband imposed it by violence, he might be held guilty of a crime.'
Wills J. referred to the proposition that rape between married persons
was impossible, as one "to which I certainly am not prepared to assent,
2

Note, supra note 1, at 309.

3 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *629.
' The Queen v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23 (Cr. Cas. Res 1888).
"Id. at 46 (Stephen, J.; id. at 64 (Pollock, B.) (quoting Lord Hale).
* Id. at 64 (Pollock, B.).
Id. at 51 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 37 (Smith, J.).
* Id. at 57 (Field, J. dissenting).
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and for which there seems to me to be no sufficient authority."1 0
In R. v. Clark,"" the first English case in which the issue of marital
rape was dealt with directly, the court held that the wife's consent was
revoked by the separation order which she had obtained and that therefore her husband could be found guilty of rape. Byrne J. followed the
judgment of Hawkins J. in Clarence in stating that consent continued
only as long as the "ordinary relations created by the marriage contract
subsisted between them."12 Later English cases followed the same line of
reasoning. Although in R. v. Miller1 s the court held that a petition for
divorce did not revoke the wife's consent, in R. v. O'Brian14 a decree nisi
of divorce served as sufficient revocation. In R. v. Steele,15 a case in which
the couple was separated, the husband's promise to the court that he
would not molest his wife effectively revoked consent.
These five court decisions reduced the scope of the common law principle. Matrimonial consent, which Hale viewed as irrevocable, may now
be revoked in England under certain limited circumstances. As one commentator has noted, however, "the courts have never acknowledged as
valid any withdrawal of the wife's consent to intercourse other than an
order by the court of possibly an agreement by the spouses to separate." 6
In Canada, these cases have had no effect. Rape was first statutorily
defined in Canada in 1892.17 Section 266 of the Criminal Code, 1892 read:
"Rape is the act of a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is not
his wife without her consent, or with consent, which has been extorted by
threats or fear of bodily harm. . ...IsThe legislative history of this stat-

ute did not indicate that the legislators intended to do anything other
than codify the state of the law on spousal immunity as it existed in England and Canada at the time."9 The modern version of the Criminal Code
also specifically incorporates spousal immunity: "A male person commits
rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his
wife, without her consent..

.,,o

By definition a man in Canada cannot

rape his wife, regardless of whether they are cohabiting or are separated.
The words in the statute are unambiguous. In Canada no cases in which
the accused and the complainant were married at the time of the offence
10

Id. at 33 (Wills, J.).

11R. v. Clarke, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448, 449 (Leeds Assizes).
12

Id.

"5R. v. Miller, [1954] 2 Q.B. 282, 290.
14 R. v. O'Brien, [1974] 3 All E.R. 663, 665 (Crown Ct. Birstol).
15R. v. Steele, 65 Cr. App. 22, 25 (C.A. 1976).
16Mitra, ". . . For She Has No Right or Power to Refuse Her Consent, 1979 CraM. L.
REV. 558, 562.
'7 Criminal Code, 1892, ch. 29, § 266, 1892-1893 Can. Stat. 107, 208.
18 Id.

19See generally, PAuL. DEB., SEN. (1892); 1 PmL. DEB., H.C. (1892); 11 id.
10 An Act Respecting The Criminal Law, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 143 (1970).

1983]

RAPE LAW

have been reported. 21 Abolition of the spousal exemption or reduction of
its scope can only be achieved through statutory amendment.
The status of the law in the United States, prior to reform, was identical to the position taken in Canada. Virtually "no criminal liability on
behalf of a husband for an assault to rape, or a rape upon his wife, where
he is charged as the prime actor...,,22 was imposed. This rule developed
from the common law and was based on the "mutual matrimonial consent" theory enunciated by Lord Hale. It was first applied in the United
States in Commonwealth v. Fogerty23 where the court in dictum stated
that the defendant's marriage to the victim was a defence to the charge of
rape. The court in Frazierv. State24 referred to five other cases following
Fogerty and concluded:
So far as we are aware, all the authorities hold that a man cannot himself
be guilty of actual rape upon his wife. One of the main reasons being
when she assumes the marriage relation and which the law will not permit her to retract in order to charge her husband with the offense of
rape.1 5
The marital exemption is specifically adopted by statute in twelve of
the American states 26 and in nine others, while no reference is made to
21

In R. v. Faulkner,16 B.C. 229, 19 Can. Crim. Cas. 47 (1911), the accused had been

convicted at trial of raping a young girl. On appeal, defense counsel argued unsuccessfully
that the accused had been wrongfully convicted on the ground that the Crown had failed
to prove that the girl was not the accused's wife. The court concluded that there was evidence in the Crown's case from which the jury could infer that the complainant and the
accused were not married.
22 Annot., 84 A.L.R. 2d 1017, 1019 (1962).
22 Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 69 Am. Dec. 264 (1857).
24 Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1915).
1, Id. at 143, 86 S.W. at 755.
24 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4)(1975 & 1977 Supp.)(defining "femal6" as "any female person who is not married to the actor"). ARiz. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406(A) (1978) ("A person
commits sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse ...
with any person not his or her spouse .... "); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-65(3),
67(b)(West Supp. 1981)(defining "sexual contact" as "contact with the intimate parts of a
person not married to the actor" and providing that cohabitation, regardless of mar ital
status, is an affirmative defense); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1979)("male
person ...
who has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife ....
commits rape");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(1)(1981)("Rape is the act of sexual intercourse committed by a
man with a woman not his wife ...
."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Page Supp.
1980)("No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender. . . ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. titl 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 1981) ("Rape is not an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished with a male or female, not the spouse of the perpetrator
...
); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1981)("Rape is an act of sexual penetration
accomplished with any person other than the actor's spouse .... ); T'x. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.02(a)(Vernon 1974)("A person commits an offense if he has sexual intercourse with a
female not his wife ....
"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1981)("A person who engages in a sexual act with another person, other than a spouse .
. "); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.040 (Supp. 1981)("A person is guilty of rape... when such person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person not married to the perpetrator. . . ."); W. VA. CODE
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spousal immunity, the common law rules is presumed to apply.2 7 The issue of spousal immunity has been litigated in two of the "common law"
states: New Jersey and Massachusetts. In State v. Smith,2 8 the New
Jersey court held that Hale's common law rule applied despite the statute's silence on spousal immunity. The court concluded that "a statute is
not presumed to make any change in the common law beyond that ex-

pressed or fairly implied in its provisions." 2' In Massachusetts, however,

the statute was construed not to comply with the common law notion of
spousal immunity. In State v. Chretien,0 a husband was convicted of
raping his wife when the attack occurred while they were separated and
awaiting for the final divorce decree. This conviction, however, is being
appealed to a higher court.31
Whether the spousal immunity should be retained is a hotly debated
question in both countries. Defenders of spousal immunity base their arguments on broad public policy grounds, focusing on five key grounds.
They argue first that abolition of the immunity would unduly invade the
sanctity of marriage.3 2 This argument is partially premised on the need
for privacy inside the marital relationship, and partially on the concern
that the prohibition against spousal rape might increase the probability
of marital collapse.33
Opponents of the spousal immunity doctrine regard this position as
unpersuasive. They question whether any further damage can result from
§ 61-881(7)(1977)(defining "sexual intercourse" as "any act between persons not married to
each other ...").
27 States in this category include Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
28 148 N.J. Super. 219, 230-33, 372 A.2d 386, 392-93 (Essex County Ct. 1977), af'd, 169
N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d
38 (1981). The current New Jersey Code 'ofCriminal Justice provides that a person "shall
not be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this chapter [Sexual Offenses]
because of .. . marriage to the victim." N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:14-5(b)(West 1981).
2' 148 N.J. Super, at 231, 372 A.2d at 392 (citing Blackman v. Isles, 4 N.J. 82, 71 A.2d
633 (1950)). The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the three major justifications for the
common law marital exemption, finding that each rationale was in apposite to the Smith
case, and reinstated the rape count of the indictment.
:0 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 417 N.E.2d 1203.

1' Id. at 1210.

- See, e.g., State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super at 225, 372 A.2d at 389.
" The latter concern was recently articulated in an editorial published by the International Christian Communications. The editorial argues:
The spouse rape concept will put a barrier between husband and wife in the marriage bed!
In instances where a marriage rift is growing, it will guarantee the "right" of one
spouse to deprive the other of sexual satisfaction within marriage.
It will deepen the rift at the very point where it might best be bridged. It will
drive men and women to obtain sinful sexual satisfaction outside of marriage.
New Bill Threatens The Family and PublicMorality, CHRISTIAN INQumx, Feb. 1981. [copy
on file at the JOURNAL].
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legal action, once the relationship has deteriorated to the point where intercourse is coerced." They contend that the preservation of marriage relationships characterized by violence and sexual abuse is not acceptable.
The second argument raised against the abolition of spousal immunity focuses on the potential increased risk of fabricated accusations and
blackmail between spouses. In State v. Smith the court noted that if a
wife were able to charge her husband with rape, she might gain an unfair
35
advantage over an estranged husband in a future property settlement.
The court itself, however, recognized that "the law already furnishes an
arsenal of weapons to a woman bent on revenge" and that the criminal
justice system is designed to test the validity of all accusations." The
court asserted that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the use of the jury should be sufficient safeguard to prevent falsified
complaints from resulting in convictions.3 7
The third argument against the abolition of the immunity is the contention that spousal rape is somehow less traumatic than other forms of
rape. One commentator criticizes the continuing consent doctrine as an
unreasonable inference that married women intend to be sexually accessible to their husbands at all times,3 8 yet the commentator differentiates
between what he calls classic rape: "perpetrated by a stranger in a deserted place at night," and rape within a marriage relationship. Classic
rape, he contends, is "the expression of an unprovoked, unpredictable,
and highly brutal impulse.'4 0 Where rape occurs within marriage, he argues, "the possibilities of serious social, physical, or mental harm form a
familiar if unwanted conjugal embrace are rather small."4 1
Recent studies have shown, however, that we have vastly underestimated the incidence and severity of interspousal violence.' t Sexual abuse
is often an integral part of wifebattering. In Lenore Walker's, The Battered Woman, the majority of women questioned admitted having been
raped by their batterers.' Rape perpetrated by the husband of the victim
has not been shown to be any less violent or emotionally traumatic than
rape perpetrated by a stranger. As Susan Brownmiller points out in
Against Our Will," sexual assault is an invasion of bodily integrity and a
3 See Comment, Rape in Marriage:The Law in Texas and the Need for Reform, 32
BAYLOR L. REv. 109, 115 (1980).
11 148 N.J. Super. at 225, 372 A.2d at 389.

34

Id.

27 See Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am.CraM. L.
REv. 335, 337-38 (1973).

Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STA. L. REv. 719, 722
(1954).
3,Id. at 723-24.
40 Id. at 724.
41

Id. at (footnote omitted).

See, e.g., L. MAcLEOD, WxwE BATTRING IN CANADA:
Advisory Council on the Status of Women 1980).
" See L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 108 (1979).
4

THE Vicious CiRcLE

(Canadian
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violation of freedom and self-determination wherever it happens to take
place, in or out of the marriage bed."" She notes that rape within marriage is not likely to be an isolated occurrence and that the woman's situation is often complicated by her financial and emotional dependence
upon her rapist-husband. 45 While some victims of rape by a stranger direct their anger externally, victims of marital rape often become angry
with themselves. 4" Spousal immunity reinforces the woman's feelings of
anger, guilt and humiliation. "The ensuring self-disgust is increased when
the victim wonders if she provoked the degrading7 bahavior. She may feel
she was an accomplice in her own humiliation.'
Proponents of spousal immunity also argue that the right of the wife
to press criminal charges of assault and battery"8 is an adequate substitute for her inability to press rape charges. In R. v. Miller" the court held
that although the husband could not be found guilty of rape, he could be
found guilty of assault if the act resulted in either physical injury to the
wife or in an "hysterical or nervous condition."50 This view, however, fails
to address the basic violation.5 1 A sexual assault is by nature a greater
invasion than other types of physical assault. 52 Consequently, the penalties are more severe for rape than those for battery. One rape victim described the difference in this manner: "There's something worse about
being raped than just being beaten. It's the final humiliation, the final
showing you that you're worthless and you're there to be used by whoever
wants you."
A British writer, Peter English, further contends: "The label attached to the conduct should be the appropriate label. So long as rape
remains a separate crime, not simply one'' form
of assault, conduct which
s
is in reality, rape, should be so charged.

1

Finally, it is argued that evidentiary problems "reach their zenith"
with marital rape.5 Admittedly the offence would be extremely difficult
to prove. Where the complainant and the accused have voluntarily engaged in consensual sexual intercourse in the past, the issue of consent
4

S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 381.

" Griffin, In 44 States, It's Legal to Rape Your Wife,
59.

STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1980, at 21,

" Id. at 59-60.
47 Id. at 60.
Comment, supra note 38, at 726.
49 [1954] 2 Q.B. 282.
4,

5o Id. at 292.
51 S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 381.

See Comment, The MaritalException to Rape: Past,Presentand Future,1978 DET.
C.L. REv. 261, 275. One rape victim, comparing rape with non-sexual assault, has stated
"There's something worse about being raped than just being beaten. It's the final humiliation, the final showing you that you're worthless and that you're there to be used by whoever wants you." D. RussELL, THs PoLMCS OF RAPE 77 (1975).
53English, The Husband Who Rapes His Wife, 126 NEw L.J. 1223, 1225 (1976).
Comment, supra note 38, at 724.
62
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becomes a difficult obstacle." This difficulty is compounded if the parties
are married and have engaged in consensual sexual intercourse many
times. 56 The wife must produce strong evidence that she did not consent.
Indeed, a conviction in many jurisdictions probably requires evidence not
only that she resisted, but that force was used against her. The difficulty,
however, is not sufficient justification for maintaining spousal immunity,
where it denys justice to women who are able to meet the burden of proving they have been raped.
Criticism of the spousal exemption by legal writers and feminist
groups has resulted in changes in the law. Reform in the United States
has consisted largely of incremental changes while in Canada, the broad
implications of pending reform have yet fully been realized. By 1980, 30
American states had enacted legislation to abolish or limit the common
law spousal immunity rule.57 Although the situation in many of these
states has improved markedly for married women who have separated
from their husbands, in all but seven states, the spousal exemption still
applies to spouses who are cohabitating and who have not taken legal
steps to end their marriage." In four of these states, however, the wife
must be physically injured or, threatened with serious injury before the
husband can be charged with first degree rape. 9 Only three states, New
Jersey, Oregon, and California, have effectively abolished the spousal
0
immunity.
Despite recent reforms, few men have been prosecuted for raping
their wives.41 In 1978, however, much media coverage was given to State
v. Rideout,62 the first marital rape case tried in Oregon since the passage
of legislation abolishing spousal immunity.63 John Rideout was acquitted
of raping his wife Greta when the prosecution was unable to prove her
lack of consent. Since the case turned on the evidentiary issue, the deci" See Griffin, supra note 45, at 57.

"Id.
67See id. at 58-59.
" The seven states where the spousal exception does not apply even though spouses are
cohabiting are: Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.445 (1978); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 262
(West Supp. 1980); Delaware, DiL. CODE As. tit. 11, §§ 763-64 (1979); Hawaii, HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 707-700(10), 707-730 (Supp. 1981); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2 (West 1979); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b)(West 1981); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 163.375 (1981).
" ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.445 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 763-64 (1979); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 707-700(10), 707-730 (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2 (West 1979).
"0 CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 2C:15-5(b)(West 1981);
OR. REv. STAT. § 163.375 (1981).
41 Joanne Schulman of the National Centre on Women and Family Law reports that as
of June 1981 only 23 cases of spousal rape have gone to trial in the United States. Rape of
Spouse Legal in Canada,Most U.S. States, Globe & Mail, June 3, 1981, at 14, col. 1.
No. 108866 (Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 27, 1978).
See Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J.
FAM. L. 565, 578 (1980).
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sion is not considered a rejection of the Oregon reforms." After the trial,
the Rideouts reconciled and appeared on television giving a number of
newspaper interviews. They have since been divorced, however, and in
September of 1979 John Rideout was convicted of criminal trespass for
breaking into his ex-wife's home.5 In February, 1980, he was convicted of
harassing his ex-wife and received a jail sentence. s Greta Rideout has
been described as a "battered wife caught in a destructive cycle of rebellion against and reconciliation with her abusive husband. '67 Unfortunately, the couple's behavior and the "carnival atmosphere"" which characterized the trial trivialized the serious problem of marital rape and
Oregon's attempt to criminalize it.
In Canada, bill C-53, the most recent rape reform bill, is to be introduced into the House of Commons in September 1, 1981.9 Statements
from the Minister of Justice indicate that spousal immunity will be abolished.70 One of the proposed amendments will apparently "spell out in
law that a spouse can be the victim of a sexual assault by his or her marriage partner." Section 244 of the draft bill reads:
1) A person commits an assault when
a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly...
2) This section applies to all forms
of assault, including sexual assault
71

and aggravated sexual assault.

By not specifically adopting spousal immunity, this new section is an
improvement. However, the new bill does not unequivocally state that
spousal immunity is to be abolished. An additional section stating that
the new provisions are to apply without regard to the gender and marital
relationship of the actor and the victim, is needed. Without such language
the common law spousal immunity rule could still be incorporated into
the new law. The bill in its present draft form will discourage victims of
marital rape from pressing charges. Thus, prosecutors and judges will be
forced to adopt a more "creative", law making role, one which in all likelihood they would rather avoid. The wording of the proposed reforms must
be more specific to be at all effective in eliminating spousal immunity.
6 Id.
65
66

67

Griffin, supra note 55, at 23.
Id.

Id.

" Id.

19 House of Commons C053, 32d Parl., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Bill C053
[copy on file in the JOURNAL Office].
"0See J. Chretien, Information Paper: Sexual Offenses Against the Person and the Protection of Young Persons 15 (Dec. 1980). Early news reports indicated that the proposed
legislation would "[s]pell out in law that a spouse can be the victim of a sexual assault by
his or her marriage partner." Goar, Chretien To Get Tough on Child Porn, Toronto Star,
Dec. 20, 1980, at A-6, col. 6.
1 Bill C-53, supra note 69, at § 244.
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Despite the obvious weaknesses of the proposed reforms, some fear
that the new provisions will be criticized as too radical by members of
Parliament and that the bill will not be passed as long as it is perceived
as effectively abolishing spousal immunity. Should such opposition develop it is speculated that a more specific clause would be enacted which
would abolish immunity only with respect to spouses who are living separate and apart. Such a compromise would be consistent with English case
law72 and statutory reform in most of the American states, 73 and would

reduce opposition to the reform package. Only total abolition of spousal
immunity, however, is an adequate response to the serious harms resulting from marital rape. As Dennis Drucker concluded recently, spousal immunity is a "barbaric anachronism" which "has no place in a society
which recognizes women as equal human beings and wives as more than
the property of their husbands."7 4
The law of Canada and the United States concerning spousal immunity for rape is significantly similar. Historically, both countries trace the
rationale for the immunity to Lord Hale's theory that irrevocable consent
to sexual relations was assumed through the marriage contract. The codification of criminal law, which occurred in both Canada and the United
States, resulted in the statutory enactment of the Lord Hale position. Although English common law narrowed the scope of spousal immunity, the
Canadian and American exemption was securely entrenched. Reform in
both countries, thus, become dependant upon statutory amendment.
HI. Tim

STANDARDS OF FORCE, RESISTANCE, AND CONSENT

Although Anglo-Canadian and American definitions of the crime of
rape vary historically, they are characterized by three distinct elements:
force; resistance; and nonconsent. These elements are emphasized in the
case law and the relevant statutes. Force, resistance, and lack of consent
have been described as "standards." It becomes evident during a chronological comparison that the applicable standard has shifted a number of
times. The force standard focuses on the physical actions of the accused
while the resistance standard focuses on the complainant's physical response. To establish either element, evidence of physical violence is required. In contrast, the consent standard focuses on the complainant's
subjective state of mind. The crucial element of the crime is her lack of
consent, while evidence of force and resistance are highly relevant but not
essential. A fourth element, the mens rea, focuses on the subjective state
of mind of the accused.
Historically, the common law in England viewed the elements of
See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
7' See Griffin, supra note 55, at 58-59.
7, Comment, The Common Law Does Not Support a Marital Exception for Forcible
Rape, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 181, 200 (1979).
72
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force and resistance as determinative in proving the crime of rape. Sir
William Blackstone's definition of rape in the 18th century specifically
included the use of force as a requirement, and also incorporated the
phrase "against her will". The latter implied that the victim's resistance
was also necessary.7 5 In fact, clear dissent, not merely a lack of assent was
required.76 The early English cases also favored the view that force and
resistance were required. In R. v.Jackson77 the court held that having
carnal knowledge of a woman who consented, upon the mistaken belief
that the accused rapist was her husband, did not amount to rape. The
court distinguished between compelling a woman "against her will" and
"bequiling her into consent".78 In a similar case reported 15 years later,
the accused was found guilty of assault but not rape; 79 this decision was
affirmed in R. v. Williams.s ° Fraud was sufficient to support the assault
charge whereas resistance and lack of consent were required to prove rape
but not assault.
In 1845, however, an apparent shift away from lowering of the resistance standard had taken place. In R. v. Camplin1 the accused was convicted of rape after he gave a 13-year-old girl liquor, and proceeded to
have intercourse with her after she had become intoxicated. Lord Denman, C.J. stated "It is put as if resistance was essential to rape, but that
is not so, although proof of resistance may be strong evidence in the
case."8 2 Several other judges referred to the 13th century Statute of
Westminster 3 as authority for the view that rape was defined as ravishing a woman "where she did not consent" rather than ravishing her
"against her will", implying that physical resistance was not a critical element of proof for rape.
This definition was also applied in R. v. Fletcher8 where the victim,
a 13-year-old retarded girl, was found to be incapable of consenting. Lord
Campbell referred to the same 13th century statute 5 which required
force as implied in the word ravish, and lack of consent, but did not require intercourse to be against the woman's will.86 As Lord Campbell
75 4 W. BLACKSTON, COMMENTARIES at 210.

But see J.C. SMrrH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 326 (3d ed. 1973) (indicating that
since the middle of the nineteenth century the use of the consent standard has relieved the
Crown of the burden of proving a positive dissent by the victim).
77168 Eng. Rep. 911 (1822).
76

78 Id.

7, R. v. Saunders, 173 Eng. Rep. 488 (1838).
8 173 Eng. Rep. 497, 498 (1838).
81 169 Eng. Rep. 163 (1845).

Id. at 164 (Denman, C.J.).
Id. The Statute of Westminster provied "if a man from henceforth do ravish a woman married, maid, or others, where she did not consent, neither before or after, he shall
have judgment of life. . . ." Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 34.
62

169 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1926).

85 The statute was apparently repealed. 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, 1828.
6 169 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1926).
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noted, prior to Camplin, the definition contained in the statute was apparently never referred to in the cases. Although ignored by early writers
such as Hale and Blackstone and criticized by Stephen, 87 the resurrection
of the 13th century statute effectively shifted the emphasis in rape cases
from resistance to lack of consent. The consent standard thus replaced
the resistance standard in mid-19th century England, although evidence
of resistance still retained some significance."
Defined as "unlawful and carnal knowledge of a woman by force, and
against her will" by an early Canadian writer,89 rape was not statutorily
defined in Canada until 1892,90 although it had been considered a felony
for more than 50 years prior to codification. 1 When the crime of rape was
finally codified in 1892 the consent standard was adopted with the language "rape is the act of a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who
is not his wife without her consent . "..,2This statutory definition has
remained largely unaltered to the present day.
The common law consent standard was adopted in the modern criminal law statutes in both England and Canada. The sections pertaining to
rape charges in the Canadian Criminal Code' s and the Sexual Offences
Act" of Great Britain specifically refer to intercourse without consent. In
Canada, rape is also defined to include intercourse with the woman's consent if that consent is "extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm"." At
least in theory, lack of consent need not be proven where consent is extorted by threat of violence. Conversley, if lack of consent can be proven
by the prosecution, it is not necessary, as it is in many American states,
to prove that force was used or serious harm threatened.
Although not statutorily required in either England or Canada, as a
matter of practice, some evidence of force by the assailant and resistance
by the victim is usually necessary before a court will hold that consent
was lacking. Unless the victim is completely helpless or incapacitated,
lack of consent must usually be physically manifested before the accused
will be convicted.' The victim is generally expected to show "good faith
resistance," or resistance reasonable under the circumstances to signify
she did not consent.'1 British and Canadian courts rely primarily upon
J. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 190 n.1 (1877).
" Scutt, Study of Consent in Rape, NEw ZEALAND L.J. 462 (1976).
8* S. R. CLARKE, A TREASTISE ON CRrmsmAL LAW AS APPLICABLE TO THE DOMINION OF
$7 SIR.

CANADAS 264 (1872).

90 Criminal Code, 1892, ch. 29, § 266.
91 Criminal Code, 1841, ch. 27, § 17.
12 Criminal Code, supra note 87.
"3 Criminal Code, CAN. Rv. STAT. ch. C-34, § 143 (1970).
I" The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, ch. 82.
"5 Some commentators argue that consent so obtained is not consent in the true sense
but merely submission. See Boyle, Married Women-Beyond the Pale of the Law of Rape,
1 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 192 (1981) at 201.
" See Scutt, supra note 88, at 465.
97 Id. at 466.
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evidence of force and resistance in determining consent; the central substantive issue.96 In practice, the British and Canadian positions do not
differ significantly from the American position, while some important theoretical distinctions remain.
In the United States, the applicable standard varies from state to
state. 9 The phrases "by force", "against her will", and "without her consent" are used interchangeably in the state criminal codes and are not
always treated as distinctly different standards by the courts. 100 In the
majority of states force is required, although threats of serious bodily
harm have been held in a number of cases to satisfy this requirement. 10 1
Force may be constructive or implied as well as actual.102 In some parts of
the United States, the resistance standard focuses entirely on the physical
resistance of the victim as a manifestation of her lack of consent.
In the past, the victim was required to "resist to the utmost" even in
situations where such resistance would clearly be futile or would endanger
her life. In Morrow v. State,10 3 this requirement was clearly articulated by
Chief Justice Hill: "[Resistance] must not be a mere pretext, the result of
womanly reluctance to consent to intercourse, but the resistance must be
up to the point where it is overpowered by actual force." 10' The victim
must demonstrate "the utmost reluctance and the utmost resistance" to
prevent the jury's inference that the act was not against her will.10 5 The
modem view is less strict, requiring only that resistance should be reasonable or proportionate under the circumstances. Such a requirement still
places a duty of self-defense on rape victims.""s
Comparisons can be drawn between the American emphasis on force
" Beaudoin v. The King, 5 Can. Rep. 88, 94 (1948).

"Compare LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.41 (West)(Supp. 1981). Rape--"... without the
person's lawful consent." § 14.42 Aggravated Rape---"victim resists to the utmost but whose
resistence is overcome by force or... is prevented from resisting the acts by threats of
great and immediate bodily harm accompanied by apparent power of execution.. ."; MAss.
GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 265 § 22 (West)(Supp. 1981) " .. . compels such person to submit by
force and against his will, or compel such person to submit by threat of bodily injury...";
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 11-1 (Smith-Hurd (1979) "... by force and against her will."; N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 130.05 (McKinney) (Supp. 1981) ".. . without consent of the victim... lack
of consent results from ... forcible compulsion ... (physical force ... capable of overcoming earnest resistance or a threat expressed or implied that places a person in fear of
immediate death or serious physical injury); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West)(Supp. 1980) "
... person's resistance is overcome by force or violence or... person is prevented from
resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm..."
100 Reed Harris, Toward a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. Cm. L. Rv.
613, 618 (1976).
101 See generally, id. at 613 & 615.
I"1 McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435; 3 So. 775 Sup. Ct. 1887.
103 13 Ga. App. 189; 79 S.E. 63 Ct. App. 1913.
10, Id. at 194, 79 S.E. at 66 per Hill, C.J.
100 Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard,62 YALE L.J. 55, 56 (1952).
106 Scutt, supra note 88.
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and resistance rather than lack of consent, and the rape law of England at
the time of the American Revolution. It was not until 1845 that the shift
to the element of nonconsent began in England. Canada recognized this
shift and adopted it in the 1892 criminal law codification. Similar developments did not occur in the United States, and it is only in recent years
that rape has begun to be redefined. Although modern statutory provisions tend to maintain the emphasis on force, in a growing number of
states, resistance,
particularly resistance "to the utmost", is no longer
10 7
required.

The direction of modern rape law reform in Canada is clear from bill
C-53. It retains the consent standard and incorporates the force standard,
yet places less emphasis on the resistance standard. The new provisions
are modeled after the old assault provision:
244 (1) A person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of
another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly;
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe upon reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose;...
(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault
and aggravated sexual assault.10 8

The language of the statute does not clearly indicate whether the physical
act of sexual intercourse itself constitutes sufficient use of force, or
whether some additional evidence of violence is required. If intercourse
itself is insufficient, those women who are incapable of consent or resistance due to either physical or mental helplessness, are no longer protected unless unnecessary force is used. Therefore a court could conceivably acquit a man of rape because the violence or threat to the woman was
not deemed sufficiently serious, even though intercourse occurred clearly
without her consent.
The consent provisions in the new law attempt to distinguish between true consent and mere submission. For example, Section 244(3)
provides that:
For the purpose of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of:
(a) the application of force;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force;
(c) fraud; or
(d) the exercise of authority. 1"
10 Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape Legislation, 6 WOMEN's RTS. L.
RmE. 170, 182 (1981). A number of reform states, most importantly Michigan, have adopted
a strategy of defining criminal sexual conduct without using the term consent or the term
resistance." Id. at 102 n.67.
iM See Bill C-52, supra note 69, § 244, at 8.
'

Id.
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The notion of submission resulting from the use or threatened use of
force expands the previous notion of consent standard. Submission as a
result of the exercise of authority or fraud thus broadens the scope of the
new provisions. The question of consent is to be treated as a question of
fact and is "not necessarily to be inferred from evidence of submission or
lack of resistance where force is used." 110 Bill C-53 has explicitly included
force and resistance as part of an expanded element of consent. Perhaps
this change was motivated by a desire to emphasize the behavior of the
accused rather than the behavior of the victim.
The consent issue is further complicated by the requirement that the
accused must have possessed a certain "mens rea", or state of mind,
before conviction is possible. This mental element may also be described
as the accused's intent. Both the intent of the accused to commit the act
and evidence of the act itself are required to prove a case of rape."" No
definition of mens rea exists, but rather, each crime may require a different mental element. In the case of rape, Stephen J. stated that "an intention to have forcible connection with a woman without her consent" was
required. 12 The modern view seems to be that knowledge of the rapist of
lack of consent or recklessness as to whether or not consent exists is sufficient. "The actus reus is sexual intercourse with a woman who is not in
fact consenting to such intercourse. The mens rea is knowledge that the
woman is not consenting or recklessness as to whether she is consenting
or not." 118
In recent years, the debate as to what level of mens rea is required
for the offence of rape has largely centered on the availability of the defense of mistake of fact. In the controversial British case of D.P.P. v.
" and later in the Canadian case of R. v. Pappajohn
1' 5 the issue
Morgan114
arose as to whether the defendant's belief in the woman's consent had to
be reasonable as well as honest. By a three to two margin, the House of
Lords held that the belief need not be reasonable, but merely honest.11 6
The reasonableness of the belief, however, served as objective evidence of
whether subjectively the belief was actually held.117 Lord Hailsham de110 Id.

Fowler v. Padget, 101 Eng. Rep. 163 (1978).
R. v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168, 185 (1889).
"I D.P.P. v. Morgan [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, 365 (H.L.) per Lord Simon.
"

12

114

Id.

115 32 N.R. 104 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1980).

"I Morgan met three men in a bar and took them back to his home, telling then that
they could have intercourse with his wife. The three claimed that Morgan also told them
that his wife's resistance would be a mere charade to stimulate sexual excitement. She
struggled and screamed and was helddown by three of the men while they took turns having
intercourse with her. After they left she drove herself to the hospital where she complained

of being raped. All four accused confessed in their original statements to the police but at
trial asserted that Mrs. Morgan had consented. They were convicted but were given leave to
appeal to the House of Lords.
17 [1975] 2A1 E.R. 347, 361.
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scribed the mental element required as "the intention to [have intercourse without the consent of the victim], or the equivalent intention of
having intercourse willy-nilly not caring whether the victim consents or
not." 118 Lord Fraser and Lord Cross both agreed with Lord Hailsham that
the belief in consent need not be reasonable. Lord Cross further contended that as a matter of policy it was unfair to hold a man to the duty
of reasonable care in determining whether his partner consented to intercourse. 11 ' The two dissenting judges held that an honest but unreasonable
belief of consent did not negative a rape charge. Both relied primarily on
R. v. Tolson,'" a 19th century bigamy case, in which the court stated: "At
common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which if true, would make the act for which a prisoner is indicted
11
an innocent act has always been held to be a good defence." '

Lord Edmund Davies concluded that the introduction of an objective
element into mens rea was neither a novel nor an unwelcome development.1 2 All five judges agreed that the appeals should be dismissed on
the basis that no reasonable jury would have convicted even if directed
properly. They concluded that no miscarriage of justice had occurred.
The appeal was dismissed.
Even though the appellants were convicted, the public response was
highly critical. As a result, in July 1975, the Home Secretary appointed
The Advisory Group on The Law of Rape, chaired by the Honourable
Madame Helibron. The Advisory Group reconsidered the law of rape with
particular reference to the judgment in Morgan, and made recommendations for possible reform. The Advisory Group's conclusion supported the
majority decision in Morgan that a genuine belief in consent would exonerate an accused. They rejected the additional requirement of reasonableness as untenable and in conflict with the basic principles of law that "a
man should not be found guilty of a grave offence unless he has the
requisite guilty mind, and that a genuine mistake negates such mens
rea." 12' In addition, the report noted that Morgan contained the first un's

Id. at 362.

Id. at 351-52. It is evident from Lord Cross's judgment that had the Sexual Offences
Act been worded differently he would have favoured requiring reasonable grounds for belief
in consent. Section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 stated that it was an offence "for a
"

man to rape a woman." Lord Cross then looked to the common-law and concluded that
rape was not an "absolute offence" but required "at least indifference" to consent. If the
offence had been described in the Act as "having intercourse with a woman who was not
consenting to it" (basically the Canadian statutory definition), Lord Cross would have supported the application of the reasonableness requirement. Had Morgan been decided in Canada, it is quite likely that the decision would have been different. R. v. Pappajohn, [1979] 1
W.W.R. 562, 576 per Lambert, J.A.
230 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).
"2

Id. at 181.

[1975] 2 All E.R. 347, 378 per Lord Edmund Davies quoting from Sweet v. Parsley,
[1970] A.C. 132.
122 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GRoup ON THE LAw OF RAPE, 10 (1975).
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ambiguous statement that recklessness as to consent was sufficient mens
rea.2 4 The Group concluded that this would have wide implications effecting not only rape law but also other crimes of physical violence. 2 5 As
a result of the report, amendments to the Sexual Offences Act were
adopted. 12 6 These amendments were modeled closely after the Group's
recommendations. On the issue of mistaken belief in consent the new section reads:
[I]f at a trial for a rape offence the jury has to consider whether a man
believed that a woman was consenting to sexual intercourse, the presence
or absence of reasonable grounds for such a belief is a matter to which
the jury is to have regard in conjunction with any other relevant matters,
in considering whether he so believed. 27 (emphasis added)
The new section clearly indicates that a belief in consent need not be
based on reasonable grounds. At the same time however, it emphasizes
that the reasonableness of the belief is a relevant matter which the jury
must consider in determining whether the belief was actually held. Reasonableness therefore has become a more important factor since the Morgan decision.
In 1980, the issue addressed in Morgan confronted the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Pappajohn.12s Five of the seven judges held that
the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a defense of mistake of fact. The two dissenting
judges held that the defense would have been put to the jury. Although it
was unnecessary to deal with the issue, six of the seven judges held, on
the authority of Morgan and Beaver v. The Queen, 2 ' that a mistaken
belief in consent need only be honest, not reasonable. The majority judgment on this point, given by McIntyre J., relies entirely on a paragraph
from the judgment of Cartwright J. in R. v. Rees230 which was adopted
one year later in Beaver2 1 : " . . . the essential question is whether the
belief entertained by the accused is an honest one and ... the existence
or non-existence of reasonable grounds for such belief is merely relevant
evidence to be weighed by the tribunal of fact in determining such essential question."'8 2
Dickson and Estey J.J. dissented on the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to mistake of fact. They were in
the majority, however, in deciding that a mistaken belief in consent need
22

Id. at 13.

125 Id.

The Sexual Offences Act, supra note 94.
Id. at § 1(2).
32 N.R. 104 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1980).
Is [1952] S.C.R. 531.
'2
1

131

[1956] S.C.R. 640.
[1957] S.C.R. 531, 538.

1"2

[1956] S.C.I& 640, 651.

130
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not be reasonable. In his judgment, Dickson J. reviewed the Morgan decision, and concluded that R. v. Tolson 3 3 (the basis of the minority view in
Morgan) had been overruled in Canada by Mr. Justice Cartwright in Rees
and also Beaver. Mr. Justice Martland, who disagreed with this notion,
concluded that the reasonableness of the belief of the accused was not at
issue in that case. He distinguished the Beaver case on its facts. Despite
the doubts expressed by Mr. Justice Martland, the decision of the Supreme Court in Pappajohnclearly indicates that in Canada, as in Britain,
an honest but unreasonable belief of consent is sufficient to exonerate an
accused rapist.
The enactment in Canada of a provision similar to the Heilbron
amendment to the Sexual Offences Act is proposed in bill C-53.1s Section
244(5) of the bill provides that the jury shall be instructed to consider the
presence or absence of reasonable grounds when determining the honesty
of the accused's belief in the complainant's consent. Reasonableness, although not crucial, would thus be considered a relevant factor.
In the United States the standard is more rigorous and is objective in
nature.13 5 The mistaken belief of the accused must be both honest and
reasonable. 13 This objective standard has a common law foundation and
is applicable in the majority of American states. 37 Three cases are generally cited as authority for the proposition that reasonableness is required.
In McQuirk v. State,1 "3Mr. Justice Somerville outlined the requirements
for the defence of mistake in rape:
The consent given by the prosecutrix may have been implied as well as
expressed, and the defendant would be justified in assuming the existence of such consent if the conduct of the prosecutrix towards him at
the time of the occurrence was of such a nature as to create in his mind
the honest and reasonable belief that she139had consented by yielding her
will freely to the commission of the act.
This principle was followed in United States v. Short 40 and in State v.
Dizon.141 In the Dizon case, Chief Justice Tsukiyama concluded that an
honest belief in consent based on the accused's own
"negligence, fault or
42
carelessness" was not a defense to a rape charge.
133

23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).

,4 See Bill C-53, supra note 69 § 244, at 8.
131 Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom 77
COLUM. L. Rzv. 1, 61 (1977).
I3 Note, Recent Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape 61 VA. L. REv. 1500,
1534 (1975).

137 Lewis, Recent Proposals in the Criminal Law of Rape: Significant Reform or Semantic Change? 17 0SGOODE HALL L.J. 445, 451 (1979).
IM 85 Ala. 435; 4 So. 775 (S.
Ct. Ala. 1888) per Somerville, J.

130Id. at 776.
140 4 U.S.C.M.A. 437; k16 C.M.R. 11 (1954).
141

47 Hawaii 44; 390 P.2d 759 S.Ct. Hawaii (1954).
at 769.

12 Id.
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The trend in U.S. courts may have moved away from an objective
and towards a subjective standard. Revisions of statutory definitions of
rape place increased emphasis on the conduct and intentions of the accused. 148 The Model Penal Code, drafted in 1962 by the American Law
Institute, recommended that a mistaken belief in consent should be a
"defence" to a charge of rape as long as that mistake was not made recklessly.144 This Code has been described as having "substantial impact" on
rape reform throughout the United States. 45 Hawaii, Montana, and New
Mexico have adopted the recommended "mens rea requirement of intention for forcible rape" but it is not clear that this change has affected the
defence of mistake. 14 Therefore, the American position, in contrast to the
Britain and Canadian positions, remains that a mistaken belief in consent
must be based on reasonable grounds. Regardless, of whether the Canadian or the test is applied, it is practically impossible to determine the
mental state or intent of the defendant without regard to external factors
such as force and resistance. Where there is evidence of considerable
physical violence, the court has had little difficulty in finding lack of intent.1 47 Without such evidence, however, "determining the intentions and
understanding of the two persons becomes the crucial, and frequently intractable, problem. 1 48 The court's task becomes extremely difficult where
the evidence indicates that only moderate force was used. One commentator argued that in this situation, the consent
standard is "virtually use14
less" and "fosters meaningless fictions. '

The theory, the subjective standard focues on the state of mind of
the accused. Where little violence has occurred this state of mind must be
determined largely on evidence of the woman's resistance. The practical
result of the mens rea requirement is that the woman must manifest her
lack of consent to the degree necessary to convince the man that she is
not consenting.150 Reasonable resistance may not be sufficient. As Morgan
143 Lewis,

supra note 137.

144 A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Draft, 1962) at 24.
145 Lewis, supra note 137.
146Note, supra note 136, at 1536-1537.

Lewis, supra note 137, at 456.
Id.
149 Dworkin, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. RPv. 683
147
148

(1966).
I" Vivian Berger has concluded that the development of the resistance standard has
resulted in a shift in focus from the woman's subjective state of mind to the woman's behavior in response to the man's actions. Berger, supra note 133, at 8. In Canada, the adoption
(in a practical sense) of the resistance standard, combined with the mens rea requirement,
shifts the focus again, this time to the man's subjective assessment of the woman's behavior.
Force and resistance are perhaps the best indicators available to the court of the victim's lack of consent and the assailant's knowledge of that lack of consent. The use of the
force and resistance standard in the United States, and implicitly in Canada as well, "reflects an urge toward administrative simplicity, a search for an external standard by which
to measure the subjective element." Reed Harris, supra note 98, at 619. An external stan-
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and Pappajohnmade clear, the accused's mistaken belief in consent may
be totally unreasonable as long as it is bona fide and not recklessly made.
While in Canada and Britain, the issue to be addressed is consent, not
force or resistance, the victim may be required to resist beyond the degree
that would persuade a "reasonable man" that she did not consent. In that
sense, the resistance standard in Canada and Britain may in fact be more
onerous than the standard used in the United States.
IV. THE ADMIssmmITY OF EVIDENCE OF THE COMLAINANT'S PRIOR
SEXUAL CONDUCT
Evidence of the complainant's sexual history has been admissible traditionally either on the issue of consent, or for the purpose of impeaching
the complainant's credibility as a witness. Evidence of specific sexual acts
with the accused or with persons other than the accused and general reputation evidence have been assessed as having varying degrees of probative value with respect to the issues of consent and credibility. The Canadian and American positions differ as to what type of evidence is
admissible and the purpose for which it may be admitted. The reform
movements in both countries have limited the admissibility of evidence of
sexual history, although recent statutory provisions vary widely as to the
degree of limitation.
In Canada, the traditional position is that the complainant may be
questioned in cross examination about her prior sexual activity but she is
not compelled to answer. Her replies as well as evidence of her general
reputation are admissible on both the issues of consent and credibility.
The leading Canadian case in this area is Baliberte v. The Queen 51 which
was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1877. Chief Justice Richards concluded that the authority in England indicated that questions
about the complainant's sexual activities with persons other than the accused could be asked of the complainant in the course of cross-examination and could not be objected to by the prosecuting officer although the
witness herself could object.152 The judge must then rule on the objection
to determine whether the complainant is obliged to answer.158 If the complainant does answer the question, the answer according to Mr. Justice
Ritchie, "must be accepted, and is not open to be contradicted by the
evidence on the part of the prisoner.""
A distinction between evidence of specific sexual acts and evidence of
general reputation for chastity was clearly discerned early in the developdard may be easier to apply, but it may, in some situations lead to inappropriate legal characterizations. At best, the force and resistance standards are based on probabilities of consent and intent. Id.
Is' 1 S.C.R. 117 (1877).
292 Id. at 131.
153 Id.
at 139.
1I4 !d.
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ment of case law. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Finnessey"5 5 held
that this distinction was crucial. In that case, the complainant was required to answer questions about her general reputation for chastity and
about whether she had previously had intercourse with the accused. Evidence which contradicted her testimony could be presented by defence
counsel, since such evidence was considered relevant to the consent issue.156 In contrast, the court held that the complainant could not be compelled to answer questions about specific sexual acts with persons other
than the accused. Such evidence was considered to be "strictly to her
credit" rather than to the issue of consent. Even if the complainant answered, such questioning could not be pursued because it merely raised
collateral issues.1 57 Sexual activities 158
of the victim with other men did not
provide a defense to a rape charge.
The American position is similar but not identical to the Canadian
position. Reputation evidence is preferred over evidence of specific sexual
acts, but in most states neither type of evidence is admissible on the issue
of credibility. An unchaste reputation is relevant and admissible, however, to show the victim's consent. 15 9 Evidence of specific sexual acts with
a personother than the accused was excluded in the 1895 Florida case of
Rice v. State.110 Mr. Justice Liddon stated that the connection between
illicit intercourse with one man and intercourse with another was too
slight and uncertain to draw conclusions as to consent with the second
man. Most judges across the United States followed Rice and concluded
that evidence of sexual acts with a specific person raised collateral issues
which would "divert the jury's attention from the real issue."161
Whether evidence of particular sexual acts or general reputation is
admissible to aid in determining the credibility of the complainant is another controversial issue. The logic behind admitting such evidence to determine credibility was first questioned in a 19th century California
case.1 62 The complainant was under the age of consent and therefore, consent was not at issue. The defence attempted to present evidence of her
prior sexual behavior, but the Court refused to admit it on the ground
that it was immaterial since it related only to consent. The Judge criticized the attempt to use evidence of that type to attack the complainants
credibility by noting the inconsistency using prior sexual conduct evidence to determine the credibility of a complainant in a rape case but not
the veracity of a female witness in any other type of case. More recently a
Missouri court concluded that the credibility of a witness could not be
10 C.C.C. 347 (Ont. C.A. 1906).
15 Id. at 351.
157 Id.
15

Gross v. Bodrecht, 24 O.A.R. 689, per Osler, J.A. (Ont. C.A. 1897).

159 Berger, supra note 135, at 17.
16 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895).

Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 218 S.E.2d 445 (1975).
162 People v. Hohnson, 106 Cal. 289, 39 P.622 (1895).
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impeached in forcible rape cases by evidence of a bad moral reputation."3
The court concluded that it already had sufficient latitude to deal with
false accusations and that attacks on the complainant's credibility using
evidence of unchastity were unnecessary and should be prevented.
The growing trend toward evidentiary reform of rape law has led to a
reassessment of the traditional arguments favoring the admissibility of
evidence of the complainant's sexual history. The primary argument for
admissibility is that such evidence is relevant on the issue of consent because an unchaste woman is thought to be more likely to consent to intercourse in any given situation than a "chaste" or virtuous" woman. 1 " The
classic articulation of this view can be found in People v. Abbott 1"4 where
Judge Cowan made the distinction between a woman "who has already
submitted herself to the lewd embraces of another, and the coy and modest female severely chaste and instinctively shuddering at the thought of
impurity."" 6 He then asked "and will you not more readily infer assent in
the practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous
Lucretia? ' 11 67 The same view was expressed more directly in a recent
American law journal article: "Knowledge of the complaining witness's
prior sexual history increases the trier of fact's predictive ability to determine what her propensity to consent to intercourse was at the time of the
alleged rape."1 66
The link between chastity and general credibility is less clear. The
chief American proponent of the theory that promiscuity imparts dishonesty has been Dean John Henry Wigmore. 169 Wigmore supported the general evidentiary rule, adopted in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions, that
evidence of bad general character or specific qualities other than veracity
should not be admitted.1 70 He made a crucial distinction, however, where
a woman accused a man of a sexual offence. Wigmore contended that the
credibility of a complainant in a sex offense case could only be determined if evidence of her chastity was admissible and assessable by a psymost American courts. Only a
chiatrist. This view has been rejected by 171
few jurisdictions admitting such evidence.
As noted earlier, reform in this area has been directed towards limiting, rather than expanding, the admissibility of evidence. A number of
commentators have shown support in recent years for this development.
l" State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1960).
People v. Collins, 25 IM.2d 605, 611, 186 N.E. 2d 30, 33 (1962).
19 Wend. 192, (N.Y. 1838) quoted in Berger, supra note 133, at 16.
19 Wend. 192, 195-96 (N.Y. 1838).
"7

Id.

I" Eisenbud, Limitations on The Right to Introduce Evidence Pertainingto the Prior
Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOisTRA L. REv. 403, 417 (1975).
169 Berger, supra note 135, at 16.
'o WIGMORE, 3A EVMENCE iN TRIuLs Or COMMON LAw, 734 (1970).
7 Berger, supra note 135, at 22.
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Mr. Justice E.L. Haines of the Supreme Court of Ontario described the
problem:
At the outset it must be realized that a jury is very selective in enforcing
the law. Defence lawyers know this and if they can demean the victim
they increase their client's chances of acquittal. In the guise of enquiring
into consent they engage in character assassination which can be absolutely devastating to the female.17'
Other critics contend that evidence of prior sexual conduct is only
remotely related to the issue of the complainant's credibility, 17 and that
admission of such evidence will introduce collateral issues, needlessly confusing the jury.17 4 Testimony regarding the specific sexual acts of the
complainant may well be fabricated, particularly if the witnesses are
friends of the accused. 175 Evidence of her "unchaste reputation" may be
based on rumor and innuendo rather than fact.17 The exclusion of evidence of sexual conduct protects the privacy of the rape victim, reduces
the trauma and embarrassment she experiences, and perhaps increases
the proportion of rapes which are reported as well as the number of convictions obtained." 7
In the early 1970's, pressure for reform of U.S. rape laws centered
around the courts' use of evidence of prior sexual conduct. The relationship between the woman's chastity and whether a crime had been committed was too attenuated to warrant receiving such evidence.178 By 1979,
45 American states had enacted "rape-shield laws" which are designed 17to
limit the use of evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct. '
These statutes ranged from the highly restrictive; including those enacted
in Michigan and Louisiana, to the highly premissive; including Texas,
New Mexico, Alaska, New York, and Nevada statutes.18 0 Permissive rapeshield laws have been criticized as ineffective in altering the broad discretion to exclude evidence already possessed by trial judges. Conversely, reJustice Haines, The Characterof the Rape Victim, 23 CHrrr's L.J. 57 (1975).
Le Grand, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALn,. L. Rzv. 919,
939 (1973).
174 Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 218 S.E.2d 445 (1975); Rice v. State, 35 Fla.
236, 17 So. 286 (1895).
175 Ellis Mathiasen, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 Wi.LAErE L.J. 36, 40 (1964). See State v. Ogden 39 Or. 195, 65 P. 449, 454 (1901) per Moor J.
"[W]hile a prosecutrix is expected to defend her general reputation for chastity, she cannot
anticipate the charges of specific acts of illicit intercourse which may be made by men who
perhaps have been suborned to testify that they have had such connection with her, so as to
secure the acquittal of the accused ... "
176 People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856).
177 Sykora, Louisiana'sProtection for Rape Victims: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 40
LA. L. REV. 268, 269 (1979).
178 LeGrand, supra note 173, at 939.
179 Tanford and Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U.
PA. L. RFv. 544 (1980).
171
173

0so
Berger, supra note 135, at 33.
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strictive rape-shield laws are said to "sacrifice legitimate rights of the accused person on the altar of Women's Liberation."1 1 The
constitutionality of these restrictive laws, particularly regarding the Sixth
Amemdment right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him,
16 2
has been questioned in numerous articles.
The Michigan statute was among the first of the rape-shield laws to
be enacted. It has since been used as a model for other restrictive statutes.180 In Michigan, evidence of sexual conduct with the defendant is
admissible as well as evidence of sexual activity with others, if such evidence shows the source of "semen, pregnancy or disease." Such evidence
must, however, be material to a fact at issue and its prejudicial nature
cannot exceed its probative value. 1" All other evidence of the victim's
prior sexual conduct or reputation for chastity is inadmissible. The enactId. at 32.
Sroufe, Evidence-Admissibility of the Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under
Washington's Rape Evidence Law-Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150 (1976), 52 WASH. L. Rv.
1011, 1017 (1977); Berger, supra note 133; Burnim, Massachusetts Rape-Shield Law-An
Overstep in the Right Direction, 64 MAss. L. Rzv. 61 (1979). Eisenbud, supra note 168;
Nicoll, Idaho Code 18-6105: A Limitation on the Use of Evidence Relating to the Prior
Sexual Conduct of the Prosecutrix in Idaho Rape Trials 40 LA. L. Rev. 268 (1979);
Whittmore, Evidence: Evidence of Prosecutrix'Sexual Relations with Persons Other than
Defendant in Rape Prosecutions, 29 OKLA. L. Rav. 742 (1976).
The constitutional validity of the Michigan statute was challenged unsuccessfully in
1977. In People v. Thompson 257 N.W. 2d 368 (Mich. App. 1977), the court held that the
criminal sexual conduct statute did not violate the accused's sixth amendment right of confrontation. Judge Buns concluded that there was no fundamental right to ask a witness
irrelevant questions. He stated: "The rape victim's sexual activity with third persons is in no
way probative of the victim's credibility or veracity. If it were, the relevancy would be so
minimal it would not meet the test of prejudice." Id. at 727.
"s For discussion see: Scutt, Reforming the Law of Rape: The Michigan Example, 50
AusTRhALL L.J. 615 (1976); Rob, Forcible Rape-InstitutionalizedSexism in the Criminal
Justice System, 23 CRiME & DELiNQ. 136 (1977); Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. Rhv. 127 (1975);
Bienen, Rape III 6 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP.170 (1981).
Louisiana's rape shield statute has also been classified as "highly restrictive." Berger,
supra note 133, at 33. Evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct or reputation is
inadmissible unless it relates to incidents "arising out of the victim's relationship with the
accused." LA. Rav. STAT. ANN.§ 15:498 (West)(Cum. Supp. 1977). Evidence of specific sexual acts with third parties was already inadmissible and evidence of prior sexual history or
reputation was inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the complainant prior to reform. Sykora, supranote 175, at 27. Like the Michigan provisions, the Louisiana statute has been harshly criticized. Id. at 281. One commentator has called it "an infelexible, overly-protective rule which is not attuned to the legitimate needs of the accused."
Id. She argues that evidence of sexual history now excluded should be admissible under
some circumstances. These circumstances include where the complainant has engaged in
established patterns of indiscriminate sex which resembles the defendant's version of the
alleged encounter, where the complainant has misrepresented her past sexual history or
where the evidence supports a psychiatrist's opinion that she has fantasized the act. Id. at
276, 278. As with the Michigan statute, it is argued that it may be unconstitutional to the
extent that "important, relevant and trustworthy" evidence is excluded. Id. at 281.
" MICH. Comp. LAws ANN.§ 750.520; (Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
182
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ment of such rape-shield provisions has been cited as a major factor contributing to the substantial increase in the conviction rate for sexual assault in Michigan.1 85 The increase in the number of rapes reported and
the reduction in victim trauma have also been closely linked with the prohibition of evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct.1 86
Other states have enacted provisions which fall between the highly
permissive and highly restrictive.18 7 Typically these statutes provide that
"evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual activities is inadmissible" but a
number of specific exceptions are given.'" The most common exceptions
to the general rule of inadmissibility are the two found in the Michigan
statute: evidence of prior sexual activity with the accused and evidence of
sexual activity with a third party when used to explain a physical condition such as pregnancy or venereal disease.1 8' Less common exceptions to
the general rule of inadmissibility include evidence used to "impeach
credibility," to show a "motive for fabrication," or to show a "pattern of
consensual activity closely related to the defendant's version of the
events." 190 Some of the statutes differentiate between evidence introduced on the issue of consent and evidence introduced for the purpose of
impeaching credibility.19 1 Other statutes distinguish evidence of specific
'
Some statutes
sexual acts from evidence of "reputation for chastity.""'
impose time limits in an attempt to prevent the admission of "stale" evidence.193 The various statutes also require notice to the prosecution of the
evidence sought to be admitted or a prerequisite that the judge rule on
the admissibility of such evidence an in camera hearing. Most statutes
incorporate the balancing test which requires that the probative value of
the,, evidence be weighed against its potential prejudicial effect.' "
In the states with highly permissive rape-shield laws, evidence of
prior sexual conduct and reputation is admissible if the judge decides in
an in camera hearing that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the
case and its probative value exceeds the prejudicial nature of the evidence.195 With the exception of the New York statute,1" very few guide185 ALISON GEIST, LAw REFORM IN THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF RAPE: PRELIMI-

(1980).
101Id.; Interview with Judy Price, Education Co-Ordinator of the Assault Crisis Centre
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 27, 1980.
NARY REPORT

187 Tanford and Bocchino, supra note 179, at 557.
'

Id. at 552.

189 Id.
190 Id.

21' Berger, supra note 135, at 35.
292 Id. at 36.
293 Id.
19 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13(a) (Vernon 1981) New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. §

30-9-16 (1978). ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045(a) NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069, 50.090 (1979).
195 Johnson, Evidence-Rape Trials-Victim's Prior Sexual History, 27 BAYLOR L.
REV. 362 (1975).

19831

RAPE LAW

lines on admissibility are given. Since judges already have the power to
exclude evidence on collateral issues, or evidence which would tend to
"confuse, delay or unfairly prejudice the proceedings," the impact of
17
these reforms is minimal.
The recently added section 142 of the Canadian Criminal Code29 is
similar to those American statutes which are classified as somewhat permissive because the judge is given broad discretion to admit or exclude
evidence. Section 142 was introduced in 1975 as part of bill C-71 in response to pressure from women's organizations across Canada. When introducing the bill, the Honorable Ron Basford, Minister of Justice, noted
that formerly the victim of rape appeared to be on trial rather than the
accused. The purpose of the proposed amendments was to reduce the embarrassment felt by the victim. It was also hoped that this would, in turn,
encourage more victims to report rapes. 19
The amended section 142 specifically states, "no question shall be
asked or on behalf of the accused as to the sexual conduct of the complainant with a person other than the accused" unless two conditions are
met: 00 1) the accused must give reasonable written notice to the prosecutor of his intention to ask such questions and provide particulars of the
evidence he is seeking to adduce;201 and 2) the judge must hold an in
camera hearing and be satisfied "that the weight of the evidence is such
that to exclude it would prevent the making of a just determination of an
issue of fact in the proceedings, including the credibility of the
complainant."' 0 2
At first heralded by women's organizations, as a reform which would
encourage rape prosecution by reducing the victim's humiliation at the
trial, the amendment has since been interpreted to give the accused
broader powers to cross-examine the complainant about her prior sexual
conduct. Previously, as a general rule, the complainant's prior sexual conduct was considered a collateral issue. With the amendment, however,
such evidence, if found by the judge to be sufficiently weighty, may be
admitted on the issue of the complainant's consent or credibility.
In the first series of cases following the enactment of the amendment,
the courts held that the complainant could not be contradicted once she
had responded to questioning concerning her sexual activity.2 03 The
'" The New York statute sets forth a general exclusionary rule, followed by a number
of specific exceptions. The general exclusion allows evidence to be admitted which is "determined by the court... to be relevant and admissible in the interests of justice." N.Y. CRim.
PROC. LAW § 60.42.5 (Consol. 1971).
"1 Berger, supra note 135, at 34.
119 Criminal Code, CAN. Rsv. STAT., ch. C-34, § 142 (1970).
1

-

PAnr. Dmn., H.C., 9204 (1975).

20 Criminal Code, CAN. Rsv. STAT. ch. C-34, § 142 (as amended).
1 Id.
202 Id.
203

R. v. McKenna, McKinnon and Nolan, 32 C.C.C.2d 210 (Ont. Dist. Ct. 1976).
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amendment was viewed by the courts as a codification of the procedure
used in the past, with the additional requirement of notice. 20" In one case
the judge commented in obiter that to make the complainant compellable
at an in camera hearing would largely defeat the purpose of the amendment. 0 5 These cases were subsequently overruled, however,206 and not
until the appeal of R. v. Forsythe207 to the Supreme Court of Canada in
1980 was the effect of the enactment of section 142 clarified. Chief Justice
Laskin, speaking on behalf of the Court, noted that the purpose of the
section was to alleviate the trauma felt by the victim as a result of the
Court's inquiry into her past sexual behavior.208 The Chief Justice wrote,
"the provision also appears to balance the interests of an accused because, under the prior law, a denial of sexual misconduct with others precluded any further inquiry into what was considered to be a collateral
issue. 2 0 9 Confirming R. v. Morris210 and R. v. MacIntyre211 the Chief Justice concluded that the complainant was a compellable witness at the in
camera hearing and that other witnesses who had testified at the in camera hearing could be "put forward to impugn the credibility of the complainant. 2 12 He commented: "If this cannot be done, [section] 142 becomes almost a dead letter".1 2
Five years after the enactment of section 142, the Supreme Court of
Canada confirmed that despite the formal requirements of notice and the
in camera hearing, the ability of defense counsel to focus on the prior
sexual conduct of the complainant has actually expanded. Evidence which
before was considered collateral, can now be presented as evidence of a
fact at issue through the in camera hearing. The complainant may be
compelled to answer questions about the prior sexual activities and her
answers can be contradicted by other witnesses. Chief Justice Laskin
spoke of section 142 as "balancing the interests of the complainant and
the accused," 2 '1 4 the section has had the effect of tipping the scales even
further in favor of the accused. In the House of Commons, the Honorable
Mr. Eldon Williams of Calgary North in calling further reform of rape
laws stated that the former amendment2 15did more harm than good since it
was now "working against the victim.
204 R. v. Lloyd, 22 N.S.R. 2d 277 (Nfld. Dist. Ct. 1977).
205 R. v. O'Brien, 31 C.C.C.2d 396, 406 (Nfld. Dist. Ct. 1977).
2" R. v. Morris, 39 C.C.C.2d 123 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1977). R. v. Maclntyre, 42 C.C.C.2d 217

(Ont. Dist. Ct. 1979). R. v. Moulton, 1 W.W.R. 711 (Alb. C.A. 1980).
20 R. v. Forsythe, N.R. 520 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1980).
208 Id. at 525.
209
110

Id.
R. v. Morris, supra note 206.

211 R. v. MacIntyre, supra note 206.
"22 R. v. Forsythe, supra note 207, at 526.
213
214
215

Id.
Id. at 527.
- PA.L. DFB., H.C. 2832, 2837 (1979).
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The evidentiary provisions of bill C-53, if enacted, would shift Canada from the highly permissive end of the spectrum on the issue of admissiblity of sexual conduct to a more moderate position. Section 246.5 of
the bill provides as a general rule that the complainant shall not be asked
questions concerning her sexual activity with persons other than the accused.2 1 Two exceptions to the rule are included however. The first exception would allow such evidence to be admitted if it tended to show
that the accused believed that the complainant had consented. This exception, relating to the defense of mistake of fact,117 was probably intended to limit such admissibility of evidence of the complainant's sexual
history to information which the accused was aware of at the time of the
alleged rape, and which may have affected his subjective assessment of
whether she was consenting. It is feared, however, that the broad language of the provision might permit evidence of the complainant's sexual
history in virtually any case where her consent was at issue. The second
exception provides for the admissibility of evidence which rebuts the
prosecution's evidence relating to the complainant's previous sexual activity. "Sexual activity" has not been clear or defined. It may include only
evidence of specific sexual acts with specific persons, or it may refer to
"reputation for chastity". Additional sections include provisions for notice, an in camera hearing, and the prohibition of publication. Subsection
3 in part reverses the Forsythe decision by stating that the complainant
is not a compellable witness at the in camera hearing.
Overall recent Canadian reforms have not been effective in restricting the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual history. Even the latest
round of amendments, Bill C-53, may not be effective in limiting admissiblity. Historically, American jurisprudence on the admissibility of prior
sexual conduct evidence has been far more restrictive than the Canadian
law and recent reforms also illustrate a greater willingness on the part of
American legislators to exclude this type of evidence.
V.

CORROBORATION

Corroborative evidence can be most simply described as evidence
from a source other than the complainant which tends to support or confirm her testimony.2 18 In D.P.P. v. Kilbourne, Lord Hailsham stated that
"corroboration is not a technical term of art, but a dictionary word bearing its ordinary meaning."219 The case law does not entirely support this
liberal interpretation of the meaning of corroboration, but rather, tends
to demonstrate that a number of technical requirements and distinctions
have developed.
216See Bill C-53, supra note 67A, at 8.
217See text accompanhing notes 109-132.
21"
219

D.P.P. v. Hester, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1056, 1070, 1073.
[1973] 1 All E.R. 440, 447.
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R. v. Baskerville,22 0 a 1916 House of Lords case, provides the classic
definition of corroboration:
We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony
which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with
the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that
is, which confirms-in some materials particular not only the evidence that
the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it.221
The definition in Baskerville was developed in an effort to solve the problem of determining the credibility of an accomplice. It was approved several years later by the Supreme Court of Canada, and has been treated by
Canadian courts since that time "as if it had the force of statute.1 1 2 In

1925, England, deemed a special jury instruction based on Baskerville as
necessary to consider the testimony of complainants in sexual offense
cases. The court stated in Rex v. Jones. 2 2 "the proper direction in such a

case is that it is not safe to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the prosecutrix, but that the jury, if they are satisfied of the truth of her
evidence, may, after paying attention to the warning, nevertheless con-

vict. '' 224 Two years later this view was affirmed by the Supreme Court of

Canada in Hubin v. The King.22 5 As the cases developed, the jury instruction became necessary in any sexual offense case, including those involving adult male victims. 2

However, when the provision for a mandatory

warning was added to the Canadian Criminal Code in 1954, it only applied to testimony given by female victims. The offenses listed in the provision were, by definition, sexual offenses committed by males against
2 27

females.

A number of key words in Baskerville22 s have been interpreted differently over the years. This has caused difficulty in determining: 1) whether
testimony is "independent"; 2) whether testimony relates to a "material
particular"; and 3) whether testimony sufficiently "implicates" the ac220

2 K.B. 658 (H.L.) (1916).

221 Id. at 667.
2

STANLEY SCHIFF, EVIDENCE IN THE LITIGATION PROcEss 591 (1978).

22.
224

19 Cr. App. R. 40 (1925).
Id. at 41.

225

48 C.C.C. 172 (S.C.C.)(1927).

226 SCHIFF,

supra note 222, at 600.

Criminal Code, 2 & 3 Elizabeth II [1954], c. 51 [Canada], § 134. Instruction to jury.
Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, where
an accused is charged with an offence under section 136, 137, subsection (1) or (2) of section
138 or subsection (1) of section 141, the judge shall, if the only evidence that implicates the
accused is the evidence, given under oath, of the female person in respect of whom the
offence is alleged to have been committed and that evidence is not corroborated in a material particular by evidence that implicates the accused, instruct the jury that it not safe to
find the accused guilty in the absence of such corroboration, but that they are entitled to
find the accused guilty if they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that her evidence is
true.
221 2 K.B. 658 (1916).
221
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cused. Subsequent cases have added further requirements and distinctions. Perhaps the most important one was developed by Cartwright J. in
Thomas v. The Queen:219 "Facts, though independently established, cannot amount to corroboration if, in the view of the jury, they are equally
consistent with the truth as with the falsity of her story on this point.2Y230
Numerous facts have been held to operate as corroborative evidence.
The distraught emotional condition of the complainant, if observed
shortly after the alleged assault by other witnesses, is capable of corroborating the complainant's testimony. The jury, however, must believe
her condition was genuine, and it must be reasonably inferred that her
emotional condition is connected with the incident.23 ' The physical condition of the complainant is often capable of corroborating her testimony.
The condition of her clothing,23 2 bruises, scratches and other injuries, and
medical evidence 23 - are usually considered corroborative if the fact of intercourse, or lack of consent are at issue. Evidence of the complainant's
emotional condition is capable of corroborating her story, but evidence of
the complaint itself, although often admissable, cannot be corroborative
since it is not independent.23 4 The combination of "opportunity" and
"suspicious circumstances" has been held to be corroborative,2 3 5 as well as
23 6
a false statement made by the accused.

A series of Canadian cases has severely the use of some types of evidence to corroborate. In R. v. Ethier,2 37 Morden J.A. stated that when the
issues of whether the complainant was raped and whether she was raped
by the accused exist, it is necessary that the complainant's testimony be
corroborated by independent evidence on both issues. Despite a wealth of
evidence supporting the complainant's credibility and relating to the issues of consent and identity, the court held that there was no corroboration because the evidence was not independent of her story. The court
based its independent evidence requirement on the 1927 case of Hubin v.
The King.3 8 This case held that evidence which is admissible only by
reason of the complainant's story connecting it with the crime, lacks the
essential quality of independence. Independent evidence in the context of
corroboration has been interpreted to mean not only evidence which
comes from a source other than the complainant, but, more strictly, evidence which does not depend on the complainant's story for its relevance,
2, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 344.
"0 Id. at 354.

2,1R. v. Boyd, 17 C.C.C. (2d) 6 (Ont. C.A. 1974).
21 R. v. Kysella et. al., 133 C.C.C. 103, 104 (Ont. C.A. 1962); R. v. Price and Hansen
[1969], 1 O.R. 24.
113 R. v. Bear, 13 C.C.C. (2d) 570 (Sask, C.A. 1973).
114 Thomas v. The Queen, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 344.
145 Childs v. The Queen, 122 C.C.C. 126, 130 (N.B.C.A. 1958).
'" White v. The Queen, 115 C.C.C. 97 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1956).
237 124 C.C.C. 332 (Ont. C.A. 1969).
23848 C.C.C. 172 (1927).
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and which is capable of implicating the accused in and of itself."'3 In view
of the quantity and quality of evidence rejected in Ethier,it is quite conceivable that in many situations corroborative evidence would be impossible to obtain.
The difficulty with the definition of independence articulated in
Hubin and confirmed in Ethier was dealt with in 1976 by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the case of Warkentin v. The Queen.2 40 De Grandpre
J., on behalf of the majority, refused to give a narrow legalistic meaning
to the term corroboration. He concluded that corroborative evidence need
not be pigeonholed into the three slots of intercourse, nonconsent, and
identity. Rather, "[i]t is the entire picture that must be looked at, [and]
not a portion thereof".24 1 Although the dissenting judges found no corroborative evidence linking the four accused with the crime, the majority
held that five pieces of evidence taken as a whole were capable of corroborating the complainant's story. The decision departed from previous
cases which had followed the artificially limited conception of corroboration. Even Dickson J., speaking for the dissent, acknowledged
that the
2
corroboration rule was, to some degree, unworkable. "
In the majority of American states, corroboration of a complainant's
testimony of rape is not necessary in order to obtain a conviction.2 48 In
the states where some form of corroboration is required, there is "wide
variation both as to the elements of the crime which must be corroborated and as to the evidence considered material for purposes of corroboration.2 44 For example, in the District of Columbia, corroboration is required of force, penetration and identity.'" Prior to 1975, corroboration
was required of all three elements in New York as well.2' In Nebraska
(and in Georgia and Idaho prior to statutory reform) 4 7 corroboration is
not required of the actual offense but of the facts and circumstances surrounding it.24 8 In three other states a complaint to authorities within a
certain period of time is considered corroborative.249 Marks of violence on
the complainant' 50 the condition of her clothing,"51 and her emotional
239
240

241

Id.
30 C.C.C. (2d) 1 Sup. Ct. Can. 1976).
Id. at 20.

242 Id. at 4. "There are few problems more troublesome and difficult for a trial Judge
than that of deciding what evidence is in law susceptible of corroborative effect and what
evidence is not."
243 Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1125 (1929).
244 Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE. L.J.

1365, 13618 (1972).
245

246
247

United States v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Note, supra note 244, at 1368.
Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1139, 1140 (1929).

28 Note, supra note 244, at 1369.

249 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-71 (1962)(Supp. 1974); TEx. PENAL CODE (1974) (Supp. 1975);
Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 38.07 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1974).
21o State v. Mitchell, 68 Iowa 116, 26 N.W. 44 (1885).
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condition 25 2 have been held to be corroborative as have admissions by the
accused.258 Authorities differ, however, as to whether the woman's prompt
complaint,' a subsequent pregnancy,'5 or the presence of the accused
on the scene2 5 6 constitute corroboration.

Some form of corroboration is also required by statute in the following states and territories: Arizona, 5 7 Idaho,'" Illinois,"" Massachusetts,2 60 Mississippi,2 6 ' New York,'" Puerto Rico,2 63 Ohio,2 " and the Vir-

gin Islands.265 In Hawaii,266 Nebraska, 6 7 New Mexico, 68 and the District
of Columbia,'26 a corroboration requirement developed in the case law.
Pressure for reform in recent years has led to a reassessment of the
traditional arguments used to support the corroboration requirement, and
the mandatory jury instruction. In the 17th century, Lord Matthew Hale
stated "it must be remembered that it [rape] is an accusation easily to be
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party
accused, tho never so innocent.'2 7 0 In the 20th century, this statement

has been cited as the primary rationale for the corroboration requirement
in sexual offense cases. Quoted again and again in articles, books, and
countless decisions, the phrase7 1has only recently been criticized as both
inappropriate and inaccurate.'

'1
Hamilton v. State, 169 Ga. 826, 151 S.E. 805 (1930), overruled on other grounds) 233
Ga. 187, 210 S.E.2d 657 (1974).
15 Harper v. State, 201 Ga. 10, 39 S.E.2d 45 (1946).
15 State v. West, 197 Iowa 789, 198 N.W. 103 (1924).
25 Stevens v. State, 222 Ga. 603, 151 S.E.2d 127 (1927) (corroborative); People v. Carey, 223 N.Y. 519, 119 N.E. 83 (1918)(not corroborative).
People v. Haischer, 81 App. Div. 79 (1903)(not corroborative).
1
Ewing v. United States, 135 F.d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (corroborative); State v.
Chapman, 88 Iowa 254, 55 N.W. 489 (1893)(not corroborative).
27 ARIZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. (1956)(Supp. 1975-6)(Corroboration required if conflict in evidence of victim's intimidation).
21 IDAHO PENAL AND CORR. CODE § 18-907(4)(Supp. 1971) (corroboration may be required if victim's character impeached).

ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd)(Supp. 1975).
MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 (Supp. 1975).
"1 Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69 (Supp. 1975)(female victim's testimony must be
2'

260

corroborated).
" N.Y. PENAL
2"

'

LAW

§ 130.16 (McKinney)(corroboration always required).

P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33 (1969).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907 (Anderson 1975)(corroboration required for offense of

sexual imposition).
25 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 1706 (1964)(Supp. 1974) (corroboration of every element
required).
'" Territory v. Hayes, 43 Hawaii 58, 62 (1958).
'7State v. Garza, 187 Neb. 407, 191 N.W.2d 454, 457 (1971).
255 State v. Baba, 56 N.M. 236, 242 P.2d 1002 (1952).
1
United States v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
170

SiR. MATrHEW HALE, HIsToRiA PLAcrrORUM CORONAE, 635 (1736).

La Grand, supra note 171, at 931; Geis, Lord Hale, Witches and Rape, 5 BRrr. J.L.
& Soc'Y 26 (1978); S.BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 413, 414; People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14
171
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Rape is thought to be the most under-reported of all violent crimes
with estimated reporting rates ranging from 20 to 40 percent.2 7' Those
who do report must be prepared to withstand the stigma, and humiliation
associated with being a rape victim. They must be prepared to undergo
physical examinations by unfamiliar doctors, and intense questioning by
police, crown or district attorneys, defense lawyers and judges. Underreporting, designation of reported cases as unfounded,27 3 and a lack of
physical evidence (often characteristic of the crime of rape)'2 4 are all factors which reduce the number of fully presented rape cases. Rape is
clearly not "an accusation easily to be made" both in terms of the emotional effects on the complainant, and in terms of the likelihood that
charges will be brought. As Susan Brownmiller commented, rape, incontrast to other crimes, "leaves no corpus delecti, leaves no recoverable
physical goods, and may leave no sight of physical damage."' 75
Lord Hale accurately described rape as a crime that was "hard to be
proved." The proof required is often intangible, and there are rarely witnesses to the offense.' 76 Whether the act is criminal may depend more on
the intent of the parties than the "nature of the act itself.' '77 Lord Hale's
belief is further supported by statistics which show that rape is one of the
easiest charges to defend against. The fear that innocent men will be convicted of rape has led the legal system to develop a number of safeguards,
including the requirement of corroboration. The result has been that rape
has the lowest conviction rate of any violent crime.7 8
In addition to Lord Hale, two 20th century legal scholars have been
widely quoted in support of the corroboration requirement. Both
Glanville Williams and John Henry Wigmore advocate that the psychology of women supports the need for a corroboration requirement.
Glanville Williams, in a 1962 article, stated that "sexual cases are particulary subject to the danger of deliberately false charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a girl's refusal to admit
Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247 (Calif. S. Ct. 1975).
27,Le Grand, supra note 173, at 921; L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 57.
27
"It is important to understand, however, that police classification of a case as unfounded does not always mean that the police do not believe that a rape has occurred. More
frequently, the police use the "unfounded" classification screen out cases which will be difficult to prosecute." L. CLARK & D. LEwIs, supra note 1, at 58.
In 1977, of the 2,987 reported rapes in Canada, 1,101 were classified as unfounded. In
the same year only 579 of the 5,857 indecent assaults against females were classified as

unfounded.
274S. BROWNMILLER,

supra note 1, at 412-413.

275Id.

276COMPLAINT CREDIBILITY IN SEXUAL OFFENSE CASEs: A SURvEy CHAnACTERTESTIMONY
64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 68 (1973).

AND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTS,
277Id.
27

15 F.B.I. UMFORM CRImE Ra. 116 (1973).
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that she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed."'112 Dean Wigmore also feared that women with psychological problems would bring
false charges against men, and that in turn the jury, because of its bias,
would not recognize their falsity. He based his conclusions on the opinions of a number of doctors whom he quoted extensively in his treatise on
evidence. One such physician, Dr. Karl A. Menninger, wrote that rape
fantasies were universal among women. He concluded that rape fantasies
were universal among women. He concluded that although normal women
would not confuse fantasy and reality, "it is so easy for some neurotic
individuals to translate their fantasies into actual beliefs and memory falsifications that a safeguard should certainly be placed upon this type of
criminal charge. 1 26 0 Both Wigmore and Williams argued, however, that
the corroboration requirement was a fairly crude response to the problem,
and that a more scientific approach would be superior. Wigmore went so
far as to suggest that "no judge should ever let a sex-offense charge go to
the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified by a qualified physician." 8 1 As an
alternative, Williams suggested that complainants be subjected to a polygraph or lie detector test.28 2 The importance of corroboration has been
Conviction Rate for the U.S. - 1973.
All Crimes
Murder-Manslaughter
Aggravated Assault
Robbery
Rape

58.8%
39.7%
33.6%
29.6%
28.5%

Statistics of Criminal and Other Offenses (1973) Table 1 at 230 (Statistics Canada,
1978)
Conviction Rates for Canada in 1973
All Crimes Against Person
Rape

4,691
7,035
82
206
charges convictions

66.7%
39.3%

(above figures do not include crimes committed in Quebec or Alberta)
As Loreene Clark and Debra Lewis concluded in their Toronto study, "the progress of
rape case through the criminal justice system reflects a highly selective process of elimination." "Only a fraction of all rapes are reported; only a fraction of reported rapes are classified as founded; only a fraction of founded cases lead to an arrest; and only a fraction of
suspects arrested are convicted." Using Metropolitan Toronto crime statistics for 1970,
Clark and Lewis estimated that only seven per cent of all rapists are likely to be convicted.
The conclusions of the study were based on an estimated reporting rate of 40%, a founding
rate of 36%, and arrest rate of 75%, and a conviction rate of 51%. L. CLARK & D. Lawis,
supra note 1, at 57.
27, Williams, Corroboration-SexualCases, 1962, Cmm. L. REv. 662.
2" WIamoR, 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924(a), at 744. (J. Chadbourn 1970), quoting
a 1933 letter authored by Dr. Karl A. Menninger of the Menninger Clinic of Psychiatry and
Neurology, Topeka, Kan.
2$ Id. at 737.
" Williams, supra note 278, at 664.
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declining, however, without a corresponding increase in the use of alternative such as those suggested by Williams and Wigmore.
A proponent of the corroboration requirement commented in a Columbia Law Review article that where no other evidence exists besides
the complainant's and the accused's testimony, the corroboration requirement automatically resolves the conflict in favor of the accused.' 8 3 The
author supported this automatic resolution arguing that while the legislature could deal with the issues in their proper perspective, the judge and
jury would be unfairly influenced by their emotional involvement in the
case.28 4 Like other proponents of the corroboration requirement, the author placed little confidence in the ability of judges and juries to assess
the credibility of witnesses, and to assess the probative value of other
evidence in rape cases. A major study done on jury behavior by Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel indicates, however, that it is unlikely the accused
will be convicted "capriciously by an inflamed jury."'' 85 In view of the results of this study it would appear that the traditional safeguards of the
criminal trial are more than adequate to protect against such abuses.
In Lord Hale's time, the accused had neither the right to counsel, nor
the right to compel witnesses in his defense. Innocence was not presumed
and guilt was not required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A
cautious approach may have been reasonable in the 17th century, but 300
procedure have "sapped the instruction of its
years of changes in criminal
' 8
contemporary validity.'

1

Opponents of the corroboration requirement argue that the use of
Lord Hale's words 87 as a rationale for either the corroboration requirement, or for the mandatory jury instruction is no longer justifiable. Hale's
statement has not been supported factually, has placed an undue burden
on rape victims; and has resulted in unrealistically low coviction rates.
The view that the corroboration requirement is unnecessary, and discriminatory against rape victims has gained prominence, and has led to
both Canadian and U.S. reform in recent years. In Canada, the
mandatory warning provision (then section 142 of the Criminal Code)2"
was repealed in 1975. The Honorable Ron Basford, Justice Minister, explained that the repeal of the section was intended to end what had been
perceived as discriminatory treatment of female victims of rape and at283Note, CorroboratingCharges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. RPv. 1137, 1139 (1967).
284 Id.
'85

Note, People v. Rincon-Pineda: Rape Trials Depart the Seventeenth Century, 11

TULSA L.J. 279, 283 (1975) referring to the study H. KVEN
JURY

(1966).

AND

H.

ZEISEL,

THE

AMERICAN

(1973).
Criminal charges involving sexual conduct are no more easily made orharder to defend against than many other classes of charges, and those who make such accusations
should be deemed no more suspect in credibility than any other class of complainants. People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra note 271.
2" Criminal Code, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-34, § 142 (1970).
286 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REP.
287

1983]

RAPE LAW

tempted rape.2 8 ' Despite reservations expressed by a number of members
of the House, the amendment passed.
In the 1976 case of R. v. p,,o90 the court held that the common law
doctrine requiring a jury warning in any sexual offense case was revived
by the repeal of the statutory provision. Mr. Justice Hughes concluded
that it was his duty to consider what evidence was capable of corroborating the complainant's testimony.2 1 This position was contradicted in a
British Columbia Court of Appeal case decided a year later. That court
concluded that Parliament had clearly stated its intention to remove the
corroboration warning requirement when it repealed section 142. Thus,
judicial resurrection of the old common law rule would effectively frustrate Parliament's intent.2 " This holding was confirmed in the Ontario
Court of Appeals in R. v. Camp, 2 ' but the court made clear that although
the common law doctrine was not revived, the judge's discretion to comment on the evidence was not restricted by the amendmente2 "
The repeal of section 142 should result in less reliance on the artificial and needlessly complex tests which have developed since R. v. Baskerville.2" The comments of Mr. Justice Dubin in Camp indicate, however, that the repeal has not affected the judge's wide discretion to
outline the risks of relying on the complainant's unsupported testimony,
and the reasons why the jury should exercise caution before convicting
the accused. Therefore, as long as the testimony of the rape victim is seen
by judges in Canada as less credible than the testimony of victims of
other crimes, the repeal of section 142 will be to some degree ineffectual.
2
Bill C-53 provisions do little to change this situation. "
S.246.3(1) When an accused is charged ...with an offense under section
246.1 (sexual assault) or 246.2 (aggravated sexual assault), no corroboration is required for a conviction and the judge shall not instruct the jury
that it is unsafe to find the accused guilty in the absence of
corroboration.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents a judge from commenting on the
credibility of a witness in his charge to the jury.
The recent trend in the United States toward reform has resulted in
the repeal of the statutory corroboration requirement in Iowa, 97 and in
Georgia.2 98 A number of other states have passed enactments which spe" PARL. DEB., supra note 199.
", R. v. P., 32 C.C.C.(2d) 400 (1976).
212 Id. at 407.
, R. v. Firkins, 37 C.C.C.(2d) 227, 233 (B.C.C.A. 1977).
R. v. Camp, 17 Ont. 2d 99, 108 (1977).
"4 Id. at 109. While the warning is no longer mandatory, similar comments be made at
the judge's discretion.
2' 2 K.B. 658 (1916).
,,4Bill C-53, supra note 69.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (West 1975) repealed by § 709.6 (West 1978).
2' GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1975) as amended by Acts 1978 (Supp. 1981).
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cifically state that corroboration is not required. 2 "9In Hawaii0 0 and New
Mexico, 01 these enactments overruled the existing case law. In the District of Columbia, the judicial corroboration requirement was overruled in
a 1977 case. 02
Reform groups were not entirely successful in the State of New York,
which until 1975 had the most strict corroboration requirement in the
United States.303 Corroboration was required of "every material fact essential to constitute the crime," 3 4 specifically force, penetration, and the
identity of the accused."3'0 Not surprisingly, New York's conviction rate
for rape was extremely low. In 1969, for example, of the 1085 men
charged with rape in New York, eighteen were convicteds'3 a 1.7 percent
conviction rate; the national conviction rate for rape at that time was 36
percent.80 7 Rather than abolish the requirement entirely, the New York
state legislature compromised in 1975. The requirement of corroboration
of force was retained but the requirement for the elements of penetration
and identity was repealed. A requirement of "some other evidence pending... to establish that an attempt was made to engage the alleged victim in sexual intercourse... at the time of the alleged occurrence" was
added.3 08 Corroboration 0is therefore required of the fact that the assault
3
was of a sexual nature. '
In a small number of states, and in Canada, jury instructions based
on the classic words of Lord Hale have been used. Since 1976, however,
the use of the warning has been prohibited by statute in Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and Colorado.310 In California prior to 1975, the following
jury instruction was mandatory in sex offense cases:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one
which is easily made and once made, difficult to defend against, even if
2"

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(1)(West 1976). MICH.Comr. LAWs ANN.

Supp.). MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

§

750.520h (1980

609.347 (West. Supp. 1981). N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN.

§

632-A:6

(Supp. 1981). WASH. RV.CODi ANN. § 9A.44.020 (Supp. 1980).
310 HAWAII Rav. STAT. § 707-742 (1976).
301N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 (1978).
:01 U.S. v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114 (1977).
sos Bienen, Rape II, 3 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 90, 137 (1977).
304 People v. Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 190, 234 N.E.2d 212, 214, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35

(1976).
305

30

Note, supra note 244, at 1368.
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1972, § 4 at 5, col. 5, quoted in Note, supra note 244 at 1370,

n.38.
.. F.B.I. Statistics quoted in Note, supra note 244, at 1370 n.38.
3"
Note, supra note 244, at 1368.
309 Id. at n.20.
310 Bienen, supra note 302, at 100, 112, 125. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-3-408 (1978)(Lord
Hale's instruction prohibited); MINN.STAT. ANN. § 607, 347(5)(c)(d)(West Supp. 1981)(corroboration requirement and Lord Hale's warning prohibited); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3106 (Purdon 1973) revised repealing compulsory Lord Hale's instruction (Purdon Supp.

1980).
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the person accused is innocent. Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the female person named in the information with
caution. 31'
3 12
In People v. Rincon-Peneda,
the California Supreme Court studied
FBI statistics relating to under-reporting, designation of claims as unfounded, and conviction rates;313 as well as the classic jury study done by
Kalven and Zeisel314 and concluded that the requirement of a cautionary
31 5
instruction was a "rule without reason.
In summary, the corroboration requirement in the United States and
Canada evolved from common law and statutory enactment. The distinction between the two countries is that in the United States there was no
uniformity on the issue of corroboration. A number of American states
required corroboration, while others did not, or had a much broader interpretation concerning what qualified as corroborating evidence. Both
countries have recently moved toward the elimination of the corroboration doctrine. However, until courts across Canada and the United States
reject entirely the traditional views espoused by Lord Hale, the effect of
these reforms may be more cosmetic than substantive.(Footnote 1l
missing)

VII.

REDEFINITION OF RAPE

Another significant aspect of recent rape law reform in Canada and
the United States involves a major restructuring of the offense's definition. This change first surfaced in the United States in the 1975 criminalsexual-conduct legislation of Michigan. The Michigan statute adopted an
expanded definition of penetration, made the offense "sex-neutral", and
provided for a "stair-casing" structure. 317 Rape and other sexual offenses
were grouped intofour degrees under the newly-named offense of "criminal sexual conduct". Force is required for all four degrees. The factors
distinguishing the four degrees include bodily injury, multiplicity of
ofeenders, use of weapon, age and physical and mental capabilities of the
victim, relationship of the victim and actor, circumstances involving the
commission of another felony, and penetration as opposed to mere sexual
contact. 316
The Michigan legislation has served as an important model for much
of the subsequent American rape legislation. Approximately 25 states
312 CAL. JuRy INsTRs., Crim. No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970) quoted in People v. Rincon-Pineda,
supra note 271.
12 People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra note 270.
31 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME RaP. (1973).
114 H. KALVEN AND H. ZmEL, THE AmmucAN JuRy (1966).
31, 14 Cal. 3d at 822, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
311 Note, supra note 285.
317 MICH. Comp. LAws ANm. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1980).
318

Id.
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have adopted a form of stair-casing, ranging from a two degree offense in

Alabama and Delaware, to four in Connecticut, and six in Washington
(three degrees of rape and three of statutory rape).31 ' Other states, such
as Utah, have retained the single offense, but provided for increased penalties under certain cicumstances.3 20 Many reform states have also reduced sex offense penalties on the theory that the reduction will cause an
increased conviction rate.32 1 In some states the definition of the offense is
sex-neutral, and includes oral and anal penetration, coerced fellatio and
cunnilingus, and penetration by a foreign object. Particularly in these
states, there has been a trend towards renaming the offense. Minnesota,
Tennessee and South Carolina, renamed the offense "criminal sexual conduct" following the Michigan example.3 2 2 Twelve states have adopted the
term "sexual assault",3 28 while two other use the term "sexual battery13 2
However, the majority of states, including states where wideranging reforms have resulted in a significant expansion of the definition of the offense,325 have retained the name "rape".
319ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61 to -64, -66, -67 (1978); ALASKa STAT. 11.41.510 to .430 (Supp.
1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1804 to -1806, -1808, -1809 (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-402
TO 404 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-70, -71, -72a, -73a (West. Supp. 1980); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 763 to 766 (1979); HAwAn REV. STAT. §§ 707-730 to -732, -736, -737
(1976 & Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.2 to .4 (West 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
510.040 to .060 (Baldwin 1975); MD. CRim. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 462 to 464c (Supp. 1981);
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b to .520e (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342 to
.345 (West. Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, .050, .070, .080, .100, .110, .120 (Vernon
1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.25, .30, .35, .35, .55,
.60, .65 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to .6 (Adv. Leg. Service 1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-3703 to -3706 (Supp. 1981); V.L CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1701 to 1703 (1964 &
Supp. 1980). WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.010 to .090 (Supp. 1980). W. VA. CODE §§ 618B-3 to -8 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(1), (2), (3), (3m)(West Supp. 1981); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-4-302 to -306 (1977).
220 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402, -405 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
321 Bienen, supra note 183, at 173.
32 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.341 to .345 (West Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651
to -655 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39.3701 to 3710 (Supp. 1981).
323 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.51.410 to .430 (Supp. 1978); ARiz. REV. § 13-1406 (1978); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-4-2 to 404 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320 (1979); Nsw REV.
STAT. § 200.366 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2 to A4 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West Pamph. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 3252, 3253 (Supp. 1981); W.
VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-# to -5 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(1) to (3m)(West Supp. 1981);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-302 to -305 (1977).
324FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West. 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(h) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1981).
325 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61, -62 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West
1970 & Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 763, 764 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2801
(West 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001, .2018 (1978 & Supp. 1981); HAwAU REV. STAT. §§
707-730 to 732 (1976 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
11-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-1 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213502 (1974 & Supp. 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:4 to :43 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17A § 252 (Pamph. 1981); Mn. Crnm. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 462, 463 (1976 &
Supp. 1981); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 §§ 22, 23 (West Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN.
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In Canada, the provisions of proposed bill C-53 2 follow the Michigan lead to a limited degree. The bill's enactment will replace the offenses
of rape and indecent assault with the offenses of sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault. The degree of physical harm sustained by the victim
and the use of a weapon by the accused will be the only distinguishing
factors. Both offenses will be sex-neutral and penetration will no longer
be required. Although the maximum penalty for aggravated sexual assault
will remain life imprisonment, the penalty for sexual assault will be reduced to ten years. The offense of sexual assault will encompass criminal
activity currently defined as: rape with a maximum penalty of life; indecent assault against a female with a maximum penalty of five years.
The legislative intent behind restructuring and renaming the offense
is to secure more convictions, and reduce the stigma suffered by victims
of rape. It is thought that the stair-casing feature will result in more convictions, while renaming the offense will remove some of the guilt and
humiliation that society has traditionally associated with the crime of
rape. Preliminary indications, based on an examination of the Michigan
experience, are that rape reporting, and the number of convictions have
in fact increased.327 It is difficult to know, however, whether there is a real
causal relationship between the amendments and these results.
Some observers have suggested that the stair-casing and expanded
definition of penetration have been the important factors contributing to
the increase in reporting and convictions, whereas the renaming of the
offense has been largely irrelevant.2 ' The proposed Canadian legislation
is unlikely to have such a significant impact since its stair-casing feature
is much less developed than Michigan's; the name change is seen as the
prominent area of reform. Although, it is premature, to preduct what impact these structural and definitional changes will have, the future will
allow a full comparative legal analysis of these various American amendments and the Canadian experience.
§ 97-3-65, -67 (Supp. 1981); Mo. AN. STAT. §§ 566.030 (Vernon 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW §9
130.25, .30, .35 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2, .3 (Adv. Leg. Service 1979);
OQIREV. STAT. §§ 163.355 to .375 (1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3122 (Purdon 1973
& Supp. 1980); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, §§ 4061 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 2222-1 (Supp. 1981); TEx. PENA CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, .03 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-402, -405 (1978 & Supp. 1981); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §§ 1701 to 1703
(1964 & Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040
to .090 (Supp. 1980).
'21 See bill C-53, supra note 69.
317 INSTITUTE FOR SociAL RESEARCH,
OF RAPE:

LAW REFoRM IN THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT

PREL m NARY REPORT (University of Michigan 1979).

326 Interviews with Virginia Nordby, former Professor of Law, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor Michigan, August 8, 1980; and William F. Delhey, District Attorney, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, July 1980.
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CONCLUSION

A comparative study of Canadian and American rape law indicates
many historical and present-day similarities and dissimilarities. Relying
upon the early English jurisprudence, both countries codified a spousal
exemption in the 19th century, and have only recently begun to remove
this immunity through statutory reform. Although historically, marked
differences exist between the countries in the adoption of the force and
resistance standards in the United States and the consent standard in
Canada, recent reforms have moved the countries closer together on these
issues. The disparate legal positions on the defense of mistake of fact may
have eliminated this distinction in practice.
The doctrine of corroboration also illustrates many similarities, although corroboration requirements have always been less uniform in the
United States than in Canada, with some states abandoning the requirement and others broadening the definition of corroborative evidence. In
Canada, while corroborative evidence has not been required, the
mandatory jury instruction has had the same practical effect.
The position of the two countries on the admissibility of evidence of
the prior sexual history of the complainant has been, and continues to be,
somewhat different. Traditionally the American courts are more reluctant
to admit such evidence than their Canadian counterparts, and the direction of recent legislative reforms have continued this pattern. Both countries, however, are experiencing a recent round of legislative reform to
redefine and to restructure the offense of rape, as demonstrated by the
Michigan legislation, and by the proposed Canadian bill C-53. Certainly
the directions for reform are similar in both countries, and continued
comparative analysis of the effects of this reform will provide a fruitful
source of information for the future development of the law of rape in
both countries.

